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In an October 2001 letter to the Chairman and ranking members of the Senate and House 
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undertake another round with many of his justifications spelled out in the 2001 Quadrennial 
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Stationing of Army Forces) used by the Army for analyses to support the 2001 QDR. OSAF 
enables systematic examination of Army stationing alternatives and prescribes an optimal Army 
stationing for a given force structure, set of installations, available implementation dollars, and 
stationing restrictions. Each alternative stationing solution satisfies numerous unit requirements 
and is evaluated with a set of quantitative and qualitative metrics. We find a more efficient 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, eight former Defense 
Secretaries (Harold Brown, Frank Carlucci, 
William Cohen, Melvin Laird, Robert 
McNamara, William Perry, James 
Schlesinger, and Caspar Weinberger) urged 
Congress to approve legislation providing 
for another round of politically unpopular 
military base closings, saying it is necessary 
for the US fight against terrorism. In their 
October 2001 letter to the Chairman and 
ranking members of the Senate and House 
Armed Services Committees, the ex-
Secretaries write: "While we understand the 
sensitivity to this effort, our support for 
another round is unequivocal in light of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" 
(Washington Post, 2001). The ex-
Secretaries echo Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld's calls for authority to conduct 
another round of base realignment and 
closure (BRAC) with the goal of eliminating 
unneeded infrastructure and freeing defense 
dollars for other uses. The 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
discusses the need for an additional BRAC 
round or Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFD 
(Department of Defense, 2001). 
This paper presents an integer linear 
program, OSAF (Optimal Stationing of 
Army Forces) developed for the Army 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 
Management (ACSIM) and used by the 
Army for analyses to support the 2001 QDR 
in response to its overarching question, 
"What are the infrastructure requirements to 
support the Army of the future?" OSAF 
enables systematic examination of Army 
stationing alternatives and prescribes an 
optimal Army stationing for a given force 
structure, set of installations, available 
implementation dollars, and stationing 
restrictions. Each alternative stationing 
solution satisfies numerous unit 
2 
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requirements and is evaluated with a set of 
quantitative and qualitative metrics. 
In the following sections we provide a 
summary of OSAF inputs, review some past 
Army stationing analyses, provide an 
explanation of the model including 
assumptions and limitations, highlight data 
observations, present sample results, and 
discuss some risks. We conclude with a 
comment about future stationing analyses. 
OSAF INSTALLATIONS AND UNITS 
The Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) 
categorizes Army installations based on the 
installation's primary mission. OSAF 
addresses five different installation types 
that share similar characteristics in the 
continental US (CONUS): maneuver, 
command and control, professional schools, 
major training areas, and training schools. 
OSAF includes each installation's available 
heavy and light maneuver training capacity, 
ranges, and facilities, and unit requirements 
for these assets. In this paper, we consider 
the current force structure consisting of 514 
major units on 44 installations and training 
areas (Figure 1) as well as a number of 
leased facilities. We also include all 
National Guard and Reserve Component 
requirements. 
The Department of the Army (DOA) 
divides its building types and ranges on each 
installation into 353 facility category groups 
(FCGs) (DOA, 2000a). However only a 
handful of these 353 provide the majority of 
the square footage units require and were 
significant factors in past BRAC studies 
(ACSIM, 2001). For results presented in 
this paper, we model 30 facility FCGs 
aggregated into the following eight groups: 
operations/administrative, aviation 
maintenance, vehicle maintenance, supply & 
storage, training instruction (active 
force), community facilities, and enlisted 
unaccompanied housing. Additional FCGs 
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the ITC). Additional range types can be 
added to the model as ARRM data matures 
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FiQUre 1. (U) Installations in OSAP 
UNCLASSIFIED 
The Installation Status Report (ISR) 
(DOA, 2000c) provides a quality rating 
(green=good, yellow=fair, or red=poor) for 
each square foot of each FCG at each 
installation. With approval from the 
ASCIM, OSAP combines these groups into 
green and other. It assumes any unit 
stationed to a new installation is given 
green-rated facilities or new construction. If 
only other-rated facilities are available, an 
upgrade cost is applied to upgrade existing 
facilities to green. OSAP does not upgrade 
the facilities for units that remain on an 
installation (units that do not move) and 
assumes that green-rated facilities are the 
last ones to be evacuated by units leaving an 
installation. 
OSAP uses metrics from the ODSCOPS' 
Installation Training Capacity/Army Range 
Requirements Model (ITC/ ARRM) that 
provides maneuver and range requirements 
(DOA, 1999). It includes the eight most 
influential range types (highest weights in 
3 
Range requirements are expressed in range-
days and maneuver land requirements 
expressed in kilometer-square-days 
(km2days). OSAP restricts the deviation 
between the required and available training 
assets. In so doing, it ensures that moving 
units do not increase training asset 
shortfalls. A subset of units can train at 
installations where they are not assigned. 
OSAFCOSTS 
Consistent with prior stationing 
analyses, OSAP considers both recurring 
and one-time costs. Recurring costs are 
further divided into variable and fixed costs. 
Fixed costs are costs that occur 
regardless of the number of soldiers on an 
open installation. (If OSAP chooses to 
inactivate an installation, it avoids paying 
fixed costs after the installation is closed.) 
The fixed cost includes fixed base operating 
costs for Garrison activities and the 
minimum community facilities. Cost factors 
and relationships are from standard ACSIM 
sources: Unit Relocation Cost Model 
(URCM) (R&K, 2001) and the ISR. 
Every unit stationed generates a variable 
cost for installation operations; implemented 
as a cost per soldier or civilian assigned to 
an installation. OSAP uses a variable cost 
based on three cost categories: Base 
Operating Support (BOS), Real Property 
Maintenance (RPM), and housing operations 
and allowances. 
One-time cost is divided into military 
construction (MILCON), transportation, and 
program management. All stationing 
actions that include the movement of a unit 
or closure of an installation incur one-time 
costs in these three major areas. If an 
installation that receives a new unit does not 
have the required green-rated facilities or 
ranges available, then a one-time MILCON 
cost is assessed for new construction or (if 
available) an upgrade from other-rated 
facilities. We constrain OSAP by a 
maximum one-time cost available for all 
stationing actions. 
All unit movements incur a one-time 
transportation cost (Forces and Organization 
Cost Estimating System - FORCES and 
URCM). The transportation cost includes 
the movement of civilians, equipment, 
military families, and the military unit. As 
in prior stationing analyses, we assume a 
normal rotation policy for military personnel 
and their families that decreases the OSAF 
portion of movement costs associated with a 
stationing action. 
PAST STATIONING ANALYSES 
There are four primary differences 
between OSAF and Army analyses for 
4 
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similar installations in the last BRAC round 
in 1995 (BRAC95). 
1. BRAC95 analyses started with a 
detailed installation and military value 
assessment including estimated weights for 
numerous installation characteristics. For 
example, a command and control installation 
could get a maximum of 140 points for their 
operations and administrative facilities out 
of 450 points in the Mission Requirements 
and Operational Readiness Category (DOA, 
1995). The Army evaluated installations on 
numerous categories, summed the weighted 
scores, and ranked installations. These 
rankings served as the basis for evaluating 
Army stationing alternatives. In contrast, 
OSAF does not rank installations. Instead, it 
examines all alternatives with respect to 
facility and training requirements, and 
economics (costs, savings, and Net Present 
Value (NPV», constrained by mission 
related restrictions. 
2. BRAC95 stressed the "payback" 
metric to evaluate an alternative (the period 
it takes for savings to exceed 
implementation costs) and used the Cost of 
Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model 
(R&K, 1994) to complete this analysis. If 
an alternative did not meet the payback 
cutoff, it was discarded. Unfortunately, this 
approach favors short-term gains over some 
potential long-term savings and may 
contribute to overlooking beneficial moves 
that occur simultaneously between different 
sets of installations. Theoretically, one high 
cost move could enable several other moves 
that in the long run (20-year period) could 
result in considerable savings. In contrast, 
OSAF simultaneously considers multiple 
unit movements and NPV. The NPV metric 
allows for a long-term perspective and 
follows United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO) guidance to "use the current 
discount rate tied to the U.S. Treasury's 
borrowing rate to calculate the net present 
value" (GAO, 1997) for these types of 
actions. 
3. Stove piping or restricting stationing 
between similar types of installations 
typified Army BRAC95 analyses. The 
"Army's process began by categorizing 
installations according to their current 
functions; broader alternative uses were not 
considered" (Hix, 2001). Because such 
restrictions can limit potential savings, we 
do not restrict stationing among installation 
types. 
4. BRAC95 exempted 26 installations 
from closure based on their high ranking. In 
OSAF, we do not exempt installations based 
on their ranking. 
Integer linear programming efforts have 
been used to assist the Army with some of 
their past stationing efforts. The Total Army 
Basing Study office used Optimally 
Stationing Units to Bases (OSUB) to 
suggest stationing alternatives during past 
BRAC analyses (Dell, et aI., 1994). OSUB 
maximizes the military value of maneuver 
and training installations using weighted 
factors from BRAC military value 
assessments, or OSUB minimizes yearly 
operating cost, or it uses a combination of 
the two. OSAF builds on OSUB but in 
contrast to OSUB, it contains additional 
installation types, facility information, 
facility quality from the ISR, additional 
ranges, the new km2Days metric for 
maneuver lands, additional cost categories, 
and OSAF minimizes the NPV of base 
operation, closure, and realignment costs. 
Loerch et al. (1996) examine possible 
stationing policies for the Army's European 
theater. Their model minimizes annual cost 
subject to constrained resources, 
implementation costs, unit proximity, and 
support requirements. Other Army BRAC 
analyses using integer linear programming 
5 
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include Singleton, (1991), Tarantino, (1992), 
and Dell, (1998). 
SUPPORTING MODELS 
The OSAF Integer Linear Program (ILP) 
recommendations provide a starting point 
for further analyses with supporting models. 
Starting with OSAF recommendations, we 
complete an impact assessment that 
examines additional details including 
strategic implications, political concerns, 
environmental issues, impacts on 
deployment, and other issues suggested by 
the recommended stationing. 
ACSIM and ODCSOPS have numerous 
models to assist them with stationing 
analyses; among them is URCM. URCM is 
an updated version of the COBRA model 
that was used to evaluate cost and savings 
for all Department of Defense BRAC 
actions in 1991, 1993, and 1995. 
URCM is a spreadsheet-based model. 
The URCM user must establish the 
stationing alternative or scenario that 
includes the units to move and installations 
to close. Using this scenario input, URCM 
calculates the associated costs and savings 
for the moves. Without the aid of a model 
such as OSAF, scenario development for 
URCM can take several days to fulfill and 
then additional time to examine the results. 
While URCM includes all facility 
requirements, it does not include training 
information. 
OSAF ASSUMPTIONS 
Key OSAF assumptions are consistent 
with past Army stationing analyses or are 
suggested by critiques of those analyses 
conducted by the GAO and other agencies. 
Facility Aggregation 
We can aggregate similar FCGs with 
minimal loss of solution fidelity. We base 
this assumption on past stationing analyses 
that identify key FCGs impacting stationing 
decisions. 
Training Metrics 
For each installation, the single metric, 
days, adequately portrays its range 
availability and km2Days adequately 
portrays its heavy and light maneuver land 
availability. Treating km2Days and range 
days as a linear commodity may provide an 
optimistic portrayal of maneuver land 
availability. By altering days available the 
impact can be assessed. 
Local Community 
The local community surrounding an 
installation can meet housing and utility 
requirements not met by an installation's 
assets. In remote areas, this assumption may 
be overly ambitious so we examine possible 
impacts for OSAP recommendations using 
other sources, for example, MILCON and 
distant communities. 
Enclaves 
When OSAP recommends moving all 
Active Component units from an installation 
(inactivating the installation), Army Reserve 
and National Guard units remain behind in 
an enclave along with non-Department of 
Defense (DOD) tenants. An enclave ensures 
installation availability, potentially limits 
environmental cleanup impacts, and 
provides Reserve and National Guard 
additional stationing assets. 
Environmental Restoration 
The DOD or the Army will pay 
environmental remediation costs for the 
majority of Army bases over the next 50 
years. We assume these costs for any 
6 
DRAFT, 27 November 2001 
closing installation are accelerated to 
accommodate any closure. We report a 
potential opportunity cost associated with 
the acceleration, but consistent with past 
BRAC analyses, OSAP does not consider 
this cost. 
LIMITATIONS 
We do not currently station National 
Guard and Reserve forces. The National 
Guard Bureau and ACSIM have a 
Memorandum of Agreement to integrate 
Army National Guard data into the standard 
Army system ACSIM uses for stationing 
analysis (ACSIM, 2000). Once this 
integration is complete, their inclusion 
should be easier to facilitate. 
OSAP does not currently consider joint 
service installations, but a stationing 
alternative that considers all Service 
installations especially in high density 
geographical areas would be beneficial to 
the Army. After data and decision rules are 
available for inter-Service use as requested 
by GAO (1997), we highly recommend 
other Service installations be added. 
When Army units are combined on the 
same installation, potential efficiencies are 
gained owing to the possible sharing of 
resources (e.g., less staff, fewer 
redundancies). OSAP does not currently 
include these potential savings due to the 
lack of any Army standard describing the 
efficiencies. 
QUESTIONS FOR OSAF TO ADDRESS 
OSAP can assist the Army in answering 
numerous stationing related questions. 
What are the infrastructure requirements 
needed to support alternative force 
structures? Real Property Planning and 
Analysis System (RPLANS) (DOA, 2000b) 
provides facility requirements and ARRM 
provides training range and land 
requirements for each unit. Given the force 
structure, OSAF can then determine 
infrastructure requirements for a set of 
facilities, range types, and maneuver lands. 
Which Active Component units should 
be stationed where based on training 
requirements, facility requirements, and 
cost? OSAF considers unit training and 
facility requirements and matches them with 
installations that can best satisfy Army-wide 
requirements. 
What facility types and/or cost drivers 
significantly impact stationing solutions? 
Post-analysis of BRAC95 actions provides 
numerous insights on expected cost drivers. 
OSAF determines what cost elements are 
driving alternatives and what elements are 
inconsequential (not necessarily an 
irrelevant or trivial expense, but does not 
drive recommendations). 
What is the one-time cost to improve 
infrastructure to an ISR level green-rated for 
various force structures? 
Does "stove piping" by installation type 
or other stationing restriction limit 
potentially favorable alternatives? Stove 
piping limits potential stationing actions by 
not allowing moves across installation types. 
OSAF (at the request of ACSIM) measures 
the impact of this type of stove piping. 
"What if' analysis provides the impact 
on facilities, training, and costs for different 
stationing actions. This what-if capability is 
a key analytical strength. From any 
stationing alternative we can examine single 
moves, installations closing, forced actions, 
stationing restrictions, and cost limitations. 
What is the capacity utilization of the 
infrastructure and training assets for 
alternative stationing? For example, an 
installation with 100 square feet of an FCG 
when all units on the installation require a 
7 
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total of 90 square feet of the same FCG has 
a capacity utilization factor for that FCG of 
90 percent. Ideally the Army would have 
high capacity utilization factors for facilities, 
ranges, and training lands. 
Cost Analysis provides an idea of the 
economies that the Army might achieve 
through a stationing exercise. Costs and 
resulting savings are estimates based on the 
best information available. History has 
shown that even with the complexity of 
moving units and inactivating installations, 
BRAC cost estimates are adequate for 
planning purposes. (GAO, 1999) 
THE OSAF ILP OVERVIEW 
The OSAF ILP, (see Appendix for a 
formulation) is implemented in the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) 
(GAMS, 1998) and solved using the CPLEX 
7.0 solver (GAMS, 2000). A typical OSAF 
run, 22,000 variables of which 4,000 are 
binary and 8000 constraints, solves in 
approximately 2 minutes on a personal 
computer. 
OSAF data inputs include units, 
installations, cost factors, and sponsor 
guidance. The overall driver for any 
stationing analysis is an Army Stationing 
Strategy. The Strategy provides conceptual 
guidance and in effect limits the stationing 
rules that need to be applied in the model. 
OSAF has an option for using either of 
two objective functions. The first objective 
function minimizes the NPV for all one-time 
and recurring costs over a given time period. 
The second (alternative) objective function 
minimizes annual recurring costs and a 
weighted (penalty) contribution for one-time 
cost. The NPV approach is the preferred 
objective because it has a long-term 
perspective and provides a recognized 
methodology for weighting costs (time-
value of money). 
Because the yearly cost of maintaining 
facilities and ranges impacts the Army's 
ability to maintain facilities for training, 
OSAF includes the yearly recurring cost in 
its objective functions. Because there could 
be a large one-time cost to move units to 
different installations in order to achieve the 
minimum NPV or yearly recurring cost, 
OSAF can limit the maximum one-time 
cost. Thus, we view a force-structure 
stationing as a tradeoff amongst shortfalls in 
facility and training assets, yearly recurring 
cost, and one-time stationing costs. OSAF 
provides alternatives for a given force 
structure by varying the allowed facility or 
range shortfall and one-time cost. 
We vary one-time funding available or 
available implementation funds to develop 
alternatives. For example, if we run OSAF, 
with zero available implementation funds, 
we derive the status quo alternative. As we 
increase available implementation funding, 
it moves an increasing number of units and 
deactivates more installations. The model 
continues to consolidate until it cannot find 
a realignment that improves the 20-year 
NPV. At each new level of implementation 
funding OSAF generates the optimal 
solution and represents an alternative for 
Army stationing. 
CONSTRAINTS 
All stationing must adhere to the Army 
Stationing Strategy and force structure. The 
Army Stationing Strategy provides general 
operational requirements and stationing 
guidance for each installation category. The 
Strategy limits or directs certain 
possibilities, and the force structure drives 
the unit and thus land, range, and facility 
requirements. 
One set of constraints forces the model 
to provide all of a unit's required facilities to 
be in a certain condition. For example, if a 
8 
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unit moves from installation A to B, then 
these constraints ensure installation B has 
the required facilities for the unit in green-
rated condition. 
The second set of constraints is for 
ranges and training lands. The model 
ensures shortages in km2Days and range-
days do not increase due to stationing of 
units. For example, if a unit requires 100 
days on a zero range, then OSAF ensures the 
range-days are available on the installation, 
or it accounts for the needed MILCON to 
obtain the range-days on the installation to 
make up for shortages. 
The third set of constraints is stationing 
restrictions or special stationing 
considerations (e.g., do not move the Fort 
Leavenworth prison complex). These rules 
are developing over time as we use OSAF 
and discuss results with the ODCSOPS and 
the ACSIM. OSAF can determine the cost 
of each stationing restriction and thus 
indicate how much the Army should be 
willing to pay to complete tasks that would 
eliminate the need for a restriction. 
The last set of constraints limits the total 
funds available for one-time or 
implementation costs. For example, the 
total implementation cost could be one 
billion dollars. Or, we can limit 
implementation costs at the category level: 
$200M for MILCON and $2M for program 
management. 
OSAF can accommodate strategic 
guidance and force structure changes 
through its data inputs and stationing 
restrictions. An example is the introduction 
of Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) 
in the force. OSAF can include IBCTs by 
adding them as units with requirements and 
can then either force them on an installation 
or examine different stationing alternatives. 
A second example of a structure change 
would be the forced withdrawal from 
OCONUS installations. OSAF could 
include such units and examine potential 
stationing. 
DATA OBSERVATIONS 
While gathering data for a model such 
as OSAF, the collection often provides 
many insights. 
GAO (1997) concludes that the "DOD 
continues to maintain large amounts of 
excess infrastructure, especially in its 
support functions, such as maintenance 
depots, research and development 
laboratories, and test and evaluation 
centers." We have found that excess 
infrastructure does exist in the OSAF 
installation types, but not to the same extent 
with the current force structure as GAO 
finds in the support installations. 
As the Army loses force structure it also 
decreases facility requirements. The 
ACSIM asked what is the relationship 
between force structure and facility 
requirements. If the Army loses 10 percent 
of its force, will it lose 10 percent of its 
facility requirements? 
If we look at the required square 
footage per person for the 16 largest unit 
groups in OSAF (Figure 2), we see the SF 
requirement ranges from ~550 to ~1,400 SF 
per person. The per-person disparities tell 
us that if the Army loses 10 percent of the 
force, it does not necessarily require 10 
percent fewer facilities. Looking at the table 
on the right of Figure 2, we see 12 of the 16 
largest Army units have a greater percentage 
of Army personnel than their corresponding 
facility requirements and four have a lower 
percentage of personnel than of facility 
requirements. 
9 
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UNCLASSIFIED 
Average SF of OSAF FCG per Person 
in 16 Major Army Units 
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Figure 2. (U) Unit facility requirements 
UNCLASSIFIED 
In addition to improving cost and facility 
utilization, another primary reason to 
restation is to mitigate the imbalance of 
training lands throughout the Army. When 
we look at the overall Army, it has enough 
training lands (gross of all lands), but with 
the current stationing plan, numerous 
installations are short - cannot meet their 
unit requirements. By restationing, we can 
possibly improve the balance between 
available lands and unit requirements 
throughout the Army, but data indicate the 
majority of training lands are placed only in 
a few locations. Thus, a full utilization of 
these lands would require extensive 
relocation, implementation costs, MILCON, 
and would have serious impacts on local 
communities. Additionally, the strategic 
implications could be significant. For 
example Alaska has over 50 percent of the 
light and over 30 percent of the Army's 
heavy maneuver lands (CAA, 2001), but 
because it is also one of the highest cost 
areas and has environmental considerations, 
it is not the ideal location for the 
preponderance of US forces. This being the 
case, the Army can take advantage of 
stationing to resolve some maneuver land 
shortages, but it will still be short, even after 
restationing, at some installations. 
STATIONING METRICS 
The OSAF ILP prescribes stationing 
solutions that we measure using the 
following six metrics. 
NPVandCost 
For both objective functions (NPV and 
yearly costs), we measure a combination of 
fixed, variable, and implementation costs 
(smaller is better). Each alternative has an 
implementation or one-time cost for 
transportation, MILCON, and program 
management. The higher the allowed 
implementation cost, the greater the 
possibilities for stationing actions. 
Complexity 
Each alternative has a number of units 
that are moved. The more units that move, 
the more complex it is assumed to be for the 
Army to implement. 
Payback 
Past stationing analyses concentrated on 
the payback period when evaluating a 
solution. OSAF can measure and does 
calculate payback, but we do not 
recommend it as a factor to distinguish 
between alternatives. We agree with Hix 
(2001) "Options that require substantial one-
time construction or other transition costs 
should not be dismissed out of hand before 
considering the net present value of the long 
term stream of costs and savings." 
Utilization Factors 
Stationing should improve the overall 
Army utilization factors for facilities, 
ranges, and lands, but this is a secondary 
concern. The primary concern is the 
10 
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availability of resources to meet 
requirements at least cost. If an optimal 
alternative has poor utilization, the Army 
could always move additional units to 
improve the utilization at an increased cost 
(according to model runs) for the current 
force structure. A low utilization rate could 
justify the mothballing of facilities. 
Impact Assessment 
Because the above metrics cannot 
capture all considerations of such a complex 
process as the stationing of Army forces, we 
examine all alternatives further with an 
impact assessment, a more subjective, post-
processing step. This assessment includes a 
panel's review for unique requirements not 
captured in OSAF including four key areas: 
strategic implications, political constraints, 
environmental issues, and impacts on 
deployment. 
• Strategic implications represent the 
Army's ability to fulfill its mission mainly 
from a geographical perspective. For 
example, the Army cannot put all forces on 
one coastline or a preponderance of forces in 
Alaska regardless of costs owing to other 
strategic concerns (e.g., homeland defense). 
• Possible political "constraints" are 
examined in terms of their cost and possible 
impacts on alternatives. Each installation 
has its own set of political considerations; 
OSAF does not attempt to model these 
constraints. As Carter and Perry point out, 
"Every member of Congress wants to reduce 
unnecessary defense spending, but no 
member wants to close a base or a 
government depot in their district" (Carter 
and Perry, 1999). If a political constraint is 
added to the model, OSAF can determine 
the cost of imposing the constraint. From an 
Army perspective, this ability helps 
leadership determine what political 
constraints impact stationing. 
• Environmental assessment includes 
remediation costs and an examination of 
possible concerns from the Environmental 
Relocation Cost Model (ERCM) assessment. 
(ERCM is a component of the ITC that 
assesses environmental and demographic 
issues.) (DOA, 2001b) For example, 
encroachment, water quality, and cultural 
resources are environmental areas that this 
part of the impact assessment would 
address. 
• For unit deployment requirements, we 
determine if the stationing of a large 
maneuver force will stress existing 
deployment infrastructure (e.g., railheads 
and airfields) at the unit's new location. 
SAMPLE RESULTS 
An Army-wide system of moves has the 
potential to save the Army billions of dollars 
(NPV). Savings are not realized for 
numerous years due to the implementation 
costs involved. Even though stationing 
actions do not provide short-term budget 
assistance, they should still be considered 
and possibly executed. Otherwise, 10 years 
from now the Army will face the same 
installation situation, cost issues, and the 
same dilemma of short- versus long-term 
perspective. 
Figure 3 represents 10 different solutions 
(example results) or alternative stationing 
actions at different levels of implementation 
cost using the minimize yearly cost 
objective function. Each point in the graph 
is the 20-year NPV and includes 
implementation costs. In the top graph, the 
Y-axis is in $10Bs, the status quo is the 
horizontal line ~$120B, and the X-axis 
represents the 10 alternatives. The bottom 
graph illustrates the level of implementation 
funding ($B). Alternative #1 has zero 
implementation funds representing the status 
11 
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quo alternative. Alternative #10 has 
unlimited implementation funds. 
From Figure 3, we see alternative #3 has 
a 20-year savings in NPV of approximately 
$2.80B, #4 ~$7.20B, #5 ~ $7.63B, and #6 ~ 
$7.50B. Implementation costs differ 
between alternatives from $850M to over 
$8B dollars. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
OSAF: NPV for Different Alternatives (20 yrs) 
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UNCLASSIFIED 
Alternatives #5 has the best NPV, but 
#4 has a small degrade in NPV with about 
half the implementation cost. Alternative #6 
has a higher NPV than #5 and uses a higher 
level of implementation dollars; however, 
the additional monies are used on moves 
that improve recurring costs but not NPV. 
The figure illustrates how we can examine 
alternatives at different implementation 
funding levels and generate both the 




When examining alternatives, the Army 
should consider all metrics. Figure 4 
provides a matrix for the example 
alternatives in Figure 3 and how they 
compare within the set of metrics. The 
black denotes the worst case for the 
corresponding metric and the white denotes 
the best case. For example, the "current" 
stationing is black for NPV because it has 
the highest NPV of all alternatives while 
alternative #6 is white for recurring costs 
because it has the lowest recurring cost of all 
alternatives. 
The benefit of multiple metrics is 
evident in the matrix; metrics highlight the 
pros and cons of each alternative. If the 
Army's goal is to maximize utilization, then 
a cost is incurred In the NPV, 
implementation costs, and complexity 
metrics. If the Army wants to minimize 
NPV, then a cost is incurred with 
implementation costs and complexity 
(number of moves). 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Metrics 
Min. recurring costs 
Color Code for alternatives: 
Irnpacti\ssessrnent Examine each area for negative impacts 
Other Issues Examine alternative characteristics 
Figure 4. (U) Differences in alternatives 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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Parameters 
Figure 5 shows that of the eight primary 
parameters in the model, the BOS costs have 
the most influence on alternatives. (For a 
complete description of all OSAF 
parameters, equations, and relationships see 
Connors et al (2001), Appendix G.) The 
variable BOS influences moving of 
individual units, while the fixed BOS is an 
incentive to close an installation. OSAF 
tends to prefer a small number of large 
multipurpose installations apparently for 
their available resources and cost 
efficiencies. 
The maneuver land requirement is also a 
major driver due to limited availability and 
the large requirements for some units. 
OSAF generally avoids deactivating 
installations with maneuver land. But 
allowing a light maneuver requirement to 
use heavy training lands allows a maneuver 
installation to close. By varying maneuver 
land availability, we can increase 
opportunities to station and support the 
development of real estate acquisition 
strategies. 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Parameter Influence on 
Alternatives 
Base Operating Support II" ~.~;Ifi~jor . 
Maneuver Land ~!MajO"< 
i-M-r-LC-O-N-----r. ~~J?r:j::'·.· 
Housing Moderate 
Real Property Maintenance Minor 
Ranges Minor 









One Time Cost 
One Time Cost 
Figure 5. (U) Parameter insights 
UNCLASSIFIED 
OSAP often targets command and 
control/administrative installations for 
deactivation. Command and control 
installations tend to be administrative 
installations with very little, if any, 
maneuver land. Because of this, the model 
sees little motivation to keep the installation 
open when cost savings can be obtained by 
moving the units. This targeting ignores 
mission related or geographical reasons to 
keep the installation open. 
The most influential implementation cost 
isMILCON. 
Ranges are a minor influence on 
moving. OSAP allows shortages to exist 
(they exist in status quo case) up to a certain 
level. Beyond this level, it forces a range 
purchase. We find that the maneuver land 
requirements are binding, while the range 
requirements are not. 
Buildable acres is an additional 
parameter that influences alternatives. We 
exclude installation with minimal buildable 
acres from possible new MILCON. 
WHATIFS 
We examine the results of many 
changes to OSAP input. For example, take a 
stationing alternative and from the 
installations that are closed - force one 
open. Or, from the installations that are 
open - force one closed. When we change 
an installation's disposition, then moving is 
impacted, and OSAP tells us the cost of the 
change. 
OSAP ensures that the Army maneuver 
land shortfall does not increase. We can 
increase or decrease the allowable shortage 
by installation or for the Army by changing 
an model parameter. In all cases, a relaxed 
maneuver land constraint allows additional 
moving and decreases costs. 
13 
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The clear division between installation 
types may be appealing; however, stove 
piping is the most constraining of policies 
and should be avoided if possible. Stove 
pIpmg significantly impacts stationing 
opportunities (decreases potential savings by 
over 30 percent). 
CAVEATS 
Risks exist in any stationing alternative 
and in the stationing process. The following 
discusses some elements of stationing that 
we need to be aware of when examining 
alternatives. 
a. Costs. Historically, the costs for 
moving (in past BRAC actions) have been 
hard to estimate and confirm (Numerous 
examples, e.g., GAO, 1997). 
b. Utilities. URCM estimates for 
infrastructure do not include utility 
upgrades. There will be a cost incurred for 
the utility infrastructure required to support 
newMILCON. 
c. Economic assistance. OSAP does 
not consider the cost of assistance to local 
communities to overcome realignment 
impacts. Although these costs may be 
substantial (GAO, 1996) they are also 
difficult to estimate in advance of any 
announced action. 
d. Environmental costs. One of the 
largest costs DOD can face on an 
installation is the environmental remediation 
cost. GAO (1997) states that "we have 
concurred with DOD not considering these 
costs in developing its cost and savings 
estimates as a basis for base closure 
recommendations. At the same time, we 
agree with DOD's position that 
environmental restoration costs are a 
liability to it regardless of its base closure 
decisions; and we note, these costs are 
substantial. " 
e. Training. 
• Estimates. The current 
estimates for Army training lands are only 
estimates and subject to change. We should 
be reluctant to divest an installation with 
significant training lands to hedge against 
shortfalls; future Army systems may require 
additional training lands. 
• Costs. A possible training 
objective would be to move units to 
installations with lower training costs. 
Training costs are a function of the 
installation, command environment, 
OPTEMPO, environmental factors, local 
policies, distances to training areas, and 
other factors not considered in OSAF. A 
consistent or standardized means to measure 
training costs across Army units would 
enable their inclusion. 
f. Environmental issues other than 
cost. Unfortunately, there are many 
environmental factors that can impact a 
stationing decision. For example, 
encroachment (due to growth in the 
installation's local community) can 
complicate new construction. Other 
environmental concerns, such as noise need 
to be considered with each alternative. 
Because these impacts are not easily 
defined, an inherent risk is incurred with 
moving units. 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE USE 
In summary, OSAF addresses a very 
complex problem - an Army stationing 
analysis. The model considers all guidance 
and determines an optimal stationing plan 
for a given set of inputs and stationing 
restrictions. OSAF establishes a starting 
recommendation quickly and enables rapid 
exploration of many what ifs. It integrates 
(but does not replace) aspects of many 
14 
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supporting higher fidelity Army stationing 
models. 
ACSIM, the study sponsor, has accepted 
OSAF and feels it meets their requirements 
for stationing analysis. ODCSOPS and 
ACSIM have used OSAF to examine two 
realignments and are preparing to use the 
model during the upcoming Army 
Stationing for Transformation Study in 2002 
and in any future base realignment and 
closure action. 




c facility condition 
f facility category 
i installation 
k maneuver land measured in 
km2days 
r range type measured in days 
t installation type 
u unit 
y unit types 
CAu set of installations where unit 
u can be assigned 
lSi initial stationing of units at 
installation i 
N set of ranges r requiring 
construction to satisfy any 
shortage 
S set of installations that share 
training assets 
UA i set of units that can be 
assigned to installation i 
FIX set of installations that are 
"fixed" open 
UTy set of units of type y 
Data: (all $ are fiscal year 2001 thousands of 
dollars and all SF are thousands of square 
feet) 
Cost data (units) 
Fcosti fixed cost of keeping 
installation i open ($) 
ManCostC program management cost to 
close installation i ($) 
ManCostMu program management cost to 
move unit u ($) 
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maxMILCON maximum one time cost for 
military construction ($) 
maxMOVE maximum one time cost for 
transportation costs ($) 
maxMAN maximum management cost 
($) 
maxCOST maximum total cost ($) 
Mcostfi military construction 
(MILCON) cost for facility 
type f at installation i ($/SF) 
Rcostir cost for a new range r at 
installation i ($/range) 
UPcostfi cost to upgrade facilities type 
f at installation i ($/SF) 
Vcostiu variable cost if unit u is 
assigned to installation i ($) 
CostSustainfi cost to sustain existing 
facilities type f at i ($/SF) 
CostNewfi cost to sustain new facilities 
type f at i ($/SF) 
TRcostiu transportation cost for 
moving unit u to installation i 
($) 
Range data 
RANmr maximum range days on a 
new range r 
RANkcapik range capacity of type kat 
installation i (KM2Day) 
RANkreqku range required of type k for 
unit u (KM2Day) 
RANkshortk existing range shortage for 
range type k (KM2Day) 
RANrcapir range capacity of type r at 
installation i (day) 
RANrreqru range required of type r for 
unit u (day) 
RANrshortr existing range shortage for 
range type r (day) 
RANoveriallowRNGir the amount of 
range shortage allowed for r 
at installation ii (day) 
allowRNG_Sr the starting range r shortage 
allowed for set S (day) 
allowKM2ik the starting KM2Days 
overage allowed for 
maneuver land kat 
installation i (KM2Day) 
allowKM2_Sk the starting KM2Days 
overage allowed for 
maneuver land k and set S 
(KM2Day) 
moreRNGshortr multiplicative range r 
shortage for all 
installations 
(day/day) 
moreKM2shortk multiplicative KM2Days 
shortage for all 
installations 
(KM2day/KM2Day) 
ADDKM2_Sk shortage allowed for 
maneuver land k and set S 
(KM2Day) 
ADDRNG_Sr shortage allowed for range r 
and set S (day) 
ADDKM2ik shortage allowed for 
maneuver land k at 
installation i (KM2 Day) 
ADDKM2ir additive shortage allowed for 
range r at installation i (day) 
mRNGshort the minimum range shortage 






facility capacity type J at 
installation i condition c (SF) 
facility required oftypeJfor 
unit u (SF) 
OTHERfi 
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green facility type J at 
installation i not used by 
currently stationed units (SF) 
other facility type J at 
installation i not used by 
currently stationed units (SF) 
Adjusted Present Value (APV) factor 
data 
APVBOSss APV for BOS costs for 
steady state stationing (years 
7-20) 
APVBOSsq APV for BOS costs for status 
quo stationing (years 1-6) 
APVBOS APV for BOS (years 1-20) 
APVMILCON APV for MILCON (years 1-
20) 
APVMAINTss APV for maintenance for 
steady state stationing (years 
7-20) 
APVMAINT APV for maintenance (years 
1-20) 








weight of one time costs in 
objective function 
percent allowed for increase 
in overall range shortage 
percent allowed for increase 
in overall training lands 
percent allowed for increase 
in range shortage at a single 
installation 
percent allowed for increase 





percent of heavy maneuver 
land in use on installation i 
military construction of 
facility fat installation i (SF) 
conversion of facility fSF in 
other condition to green 
condition at installation i (SF) 
shortage of range r at 
installation i 
green conditioned facilities 
made available by moves 
from facility type f at 
installation I 
deviation for range type r at 
installation i (day) 
deviation for range type k at 




1 if unit u is assigned to 
installation i and 0 otherwise 
1 if installation i is closed and 
o ifopen 
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Objective: 
(1) Minimize yearly costs and weighted 
implementation costs: 
I Vcostiustation iU + I Fcostj (1- close) 
i,ueUAI I 
+ Penalty (I Mcost fi milcon fi 
fi 
+ I Rcostlr rangelr 
!reN 
+ I UPcost fi upgrad fi 
fi 
+ I (TRcostiu +MancostMJstationiU 
i, uEUAj and u'i!ISi 
+ "" ManCostC close. L... • I 
+ L CostSustainlf FA Ccap elf (1 - closet)) 
cif 
(0.1) 
(2) Minimize Net Present Value 
APVBO&s (,~/cost;.station. )+ 
APVBO&qC~, Vcost"statioo" + ~Fcost, close, J 
+ APVBOS ( ~ Feost; (1- clOSe;») 
LMeostfi mileonfi fi 
+ APVMILCON + L UPeost fi upgrad fi fi 
+ L Reost;r rangeir 
irEN 
+APVMAINTSS(L(CO(~::;;:;confiJ ]] 
fi + upgrad fi 
-CostSustain fi 
+APVMAINTL CostSustainfiFACeaPefi(1- close;) 
fie 
+ APVMOVE L TReost;ustation;u 
+ APVManage ; 
[





5. LFACcapcji+milconji 'if j,i 
L FACreqjustationiu 5. agreenji 
ueUA; andUi!ISj 
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Constraint Set #1 
agreen ji + upgrad ji 5. OTHER ji 
+ L L FACrequjstationi'u (2.3) 
ueISj i' .. iandi'eCA" 
'if j, i 
FA Ccap" other "jiexit ji 5. upgrad ji 'if f, i (2.4) 
agreenji 5. FACcap"green"jiexitji 'if f, i (2.5) 
Constraint Set #2 
L L RANrreq ru stationiu 
ieS ueUAj 




5. RANrcaPir + erranir 'if i ~ S, r (2.7) 




Lekranik 5. moreKM2shortkRANkshortk 
i 
'ifk 
erran. 5. rnCTshort lr 0' 
+ RANmr rangeir 'if irE N 






erranir ~ allowRNGir (2.13) 
+ADDRNGir \;Ii ~ S,r 
eKranik ~ allowKM2ik (2.14) 
+ADDKM2ik \;Ii ~ S,k 
L RANkrequ"HV _MNVR"stationiu 
UEUA, 
~ RANkcaPi,"HV _MNVR"usehVYi (2.15) 
+ekrani"HV _MNVR" 
\;Ii ~ S,RANkcaPi"HV _MNVR" '* 0 
L RANkrequ"LT _MNVR"stationiu 
UEUA, 
~ RANkcaPi"HV MNvR,,(1-usehvyJ 
, -
+RANkcaPi,"LT _MNVR" + ekrani"LT _MNVR" 
\;Ii ~ S,RANkcaPi"LT _MNVR" '* 0 
(2.16) 
Constraint Set #3 
L stationiu = 1 \;I u 
iECA" 
station;u ~ 1- close; 
\;Ii ~ FIX,u E UA; 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
Objective: The objective function (0.1) 
minimizes variable and fixed cost and a 
weighted (penalty) contribution for one-time 
cost. The second possible objective 
function, (2), minimizes the net present 
value for all fixed and recurring costs over a 
given time period. 
Constraint Discussion: 
Set #1. Facilities: The first five equations 
ensure adequate facilities for units; existing 
units use "Green" then "Other" facilities, 
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L station;u ~ close; 
;'¢CA" and 1'# (2.19) 
\;Ii,u E UTDoD and u E UA; 
Constraint Set #4 
LMcostji milconji + L Rcost;r range;r 
ji irEN 
+ L UPcost ji upgrad ji ~ maxMILCON 
ji 
(2.20) 
L TRcosts;ustation;u ~ maxMOVE (2.21) 
;uMSi 
L ManCostMu station;u 
+ L ManCostCj close; ~ maxMAN 
(2.22) 
L Mcost ji milcon ji + L Rcost;r range;r 
ji irEN 
+ L UPcost ji upgrad ji ji 
+ L (TRcosts;u + ManCostMJstation;u 
;u¢ISi 
+ L ManCostCi close; ~ maxCOST 
; 
(2.23) 
and newly assigned units use available 
Green, Other upgraded to green condition, 
and new MILCON. 
(2.1) Ensure sufficient existing facility 
square feet at each installation or satisfy the 
shortage with MILCON. 
(2.2) Ensure sufficient green category 
facility square feet at each installation for 
units moved to the installation or satisfy the 
shortage by upgrading or MILCON. 
(2.3)-(2.5) Can only upgrade unused other 
category facility square feet at each 
installation or the other other/green facilities 
vacated by a unit stationed at a different 
installation. 
Set #2. Training: These seven equations 
constrain the stationing alternative's 
shortage of training lands and ranges. 
(2.6) to (2.7) Limit realignment so it does 
not produce any additional training 
requirement shortfall outside of allowable 
limits. 
(2.8) to (2.9) The allowable shortfall Army 
wide includes has to be less than the range 
shortfall prior to any realignment plus a 
possible percentage over the original 
shortage. 
(2.10) New ranges must be built to 
satisfy any shortfall for a subset of range 
types; however, a new range does not have 
to be built until a minimum shortage is 
attained. 
(2.11) to (2.12) These equations allow an 
overage for the set S beyond the starting 
range or KM2day shortfall. 
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(2.13) to (2.14) The allowable shortfall for 
an installation has to be less than the range 
or KM2day shortfall prior to any 
realignment plus a possible addition over the 
original shortage. 
(2.15) to (2.16) These equations ensure the 
light maneuver requirement can be met by 
the heavy maneuver capacity if heavy 
capacity is available and has not been fully 
used by heavy requirements. 
Set #3. Stationing Requirements 
(2.17) Each unit must be stationed on an 
installation. 
(2.18) Units are not stationed on a closed 
installation. 
(2.19) Units of type "DOD" are moved only 
after all other units on the installation are 
moved and the installation is closed. 
Set #4. One-time Costs 
(2.20) to (2.23) respectively limit MILCON, 
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